Russia’s “Near Abroad” Doctrine Revives Imperial Mindset, Casting Neighboring Sovereignties as Conditional

Russia has a term for neighboring countries that are treated as if they do not fully control their own diplomacy: the “Near Abroad.” The phrase is a contradiction by design—simultaneously acknowledging geographic proximity while denying political independence. It captures an imperial mindset in which sovereignty becomes conditional, granted or withdrawn depending on what the dominant power wants. A Soviet-era joke distilled the idea neatly: asked which states border the USSR, the correct answer was “whichever ones it chooses.”

Seva Gunitsky argues that the United States under Donald Trump is beginning to echo this logic, developing a kind of American “Near Abroad.” In a recent essay for Survival, he compares Trump’s posture toward Canada with Vladimir Putin’s long-standing approach to Russia’s post-Soviet neighborhood. Henry Farrell, who highlighted the argument in a crosspost, notes the framework is broader than Canada: it can be extended to places that are not geographically adjacent but have long sat inside Washington’s imagined neighborhood—most notably Western Europe, tied closely to U.S. power and protection since the Marshall Plan.

What makes the shift so unsettling, Gunitsky suggests, is that many countries previously assumed the United States would not deliberately deploy coercive tactics that damage its own interests. The expectation was that Washington might pressure allies, but not in ways that predictably backfire on U.S. strategy or impose material costs on U.S. citizens. That assumption weakens when coercion appears to be driven not by calculated national advantage but by a leader’s desire to punish perceived disloyalty. In this account, the question becomes less about policy differences and more about personal fealty: if a foreign government is deemed insufficiently deferential, punitive steps follow—even if they are self-defeating.

In Russia’s case, the post-1991 playbook for disciplining neighbors has been consistent. Moscow has restricted trade, cast doubt on the legitimacy of bordering states, and fostered separatist currents inside their territories. Gunitsky contends that Trump has reached for a comparable toolkit in his approach to Canada, combining economic coercion with annexationist rhetoric and signals of support for internal separatist movements. The details of these policies are developed in the Survival article, but the core point is that the instruments resemble those used by a regional hegemon to keep nearby states within its orbit.

The consequences, he argues, are already visible in Canada’s public mood: a broader cultural and political recoil from “America” as an idea, not merely from specific U.S. policies. That reaction is especially striking given how recently Canada treated the United States as an almost domestic extension rather than “abroad” at all. Until 2009, Americans could enter Canada without a passport—an era of casual cross-border movement that now feels remote.

Why do these parallels arise? Gunitsky’s answer is that both Putin’s Russia and Trump’s United States lean toward a spheres-of-influence worldview: great powers decide the terms of order in their neighborhoods, while smaller states are expected to comply or be penalized. The logic that places Canada inside Washington’s sphere, he argues, also helps explain why Trump might show deference to Moscow regarding the war in Ukraine—accepting, implicitly or explicitly, the premise that big powers get special privileges close to home.

History offers a likely response from the targeted states. Post-Soviet countries sought to reduce dependence on Russia by broadening trade, security, and diplomatic ties. Gunitsky sees Canada moving in a similar direction—participating in European Union defense-procurement efforts, ordering submarines from Germany, and pursuing trade agreements across Asia and Europe. Russia’s experience suggests coercion can be counterproductive: pressure meant to bind neighbors more tightly may instead push them to build alternatives.

Why it matters

If U.S. alliances are recast as relationships conditioned on personal loyalty and enforced through punishment, long-stable partners may accelerate efforts to diversify away from Washington. That has direct implications for trade, defense procurement, and the cohesion of Western security institutions. The next test is whether these dynamics remain confined to Canada—or expand further into America’s broader “near abroad,” including Europe.